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1. Progress in logic-based AI 
Hubert Dreyfus claims that “symbolic AI” is a “degenerating research 
program”, i.e. is not making progress. It’s hard to see how he would know, since 
he makes no claim to have read much of the recent literature. 
In defending “symbolic AI”, I shall concentrate on just one part of symbolic 
AI-the logic-based approach. It was first proposed in [7], attracted only 
intermittent following at first, but has had an increasing number of workers since 
1970.’ I think other approaches to AI will also eventually succeed, perhaps even 
connectio’nism. To contradict an earlier Dreyfus metaphor “AI at the Crossroads 
Again”, it isn’t a crossroads but a race including logic-based AI, SOAR, 
connectionism and several other contenders. 
How goes the logic-based runner? In fits and starts, as problems are identified 
and progress made. 
Within logic-based AI, I shall emphasize one development-formalized non- 
monotonic reasoning, because it illustrates intermittent but definite progress. It 
was first proposed in [8], gained momentum with the 1980 special issue of 
Artificial Intelligence, and summarized in the collection [3]. It has continued to 
develop, see e.g. [6]. 
Minsky [ll] mentioned the need for something like nonmonotonic reasoning, 
but used this fact as evidence for the inadequacy of logic-based approaches to AI 
and the need for approaches not based on logic. This isn’t how things have gone. 
Nonmonotonic reasoning has developed as a branch of mathematical logic, using 
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the concepts, such as that of interpretation and model, that logicians have been 
developing since the 1930s. 
The circumscription method of nonmonotonic reasoning would have been 
entirely comprehensible to Hilbert and probably even to Frege. However, no 
formalized nonmonotonic logic was developed until the 1970s. This is typical of 
the slow progress in developing mathematical logical formalisms. Just consider the 
sequence, Aristotle, Leibniz, Boole, Frege, Hilbert, Godel. Each step would have 
been comprehensible to the predecessor, yet it took a long time for the new ideas 
to appear. Formalized nonmonotonic reasoning is surely not the last step in the 
chain aimed at formalizing useful reasoning. Formalizing nonmonotonic reasoning 
required realizing that there is proper reasoning that is not conclusive and that is 
often not the same as probabilistic reasoning. 
For this reason, neither Dreyfus nor anyone else is entitled to conclude that if 
the logic-oriented AI problem hasn’t been solved in 40 years, it won’t ever be 
solved. To do that it would be necessary to prove a theorem about limitations of 
logic. Not even showing that there has been no progress at all would be 
conclusive. However, Dreyfus makes no reference to nonmonotonic reasoning in 
his book. That’s about 1,000 papers he doesn’t know about. However, in answer 
to a question at a book-selling talk, he said that claiming progress in non- 
monotonic reasoning is progress towards AI is like claiming that climbing a tree is 
progress towards reaching the moon-thus recycling a metaphor from the book. 
Although formalized nonmonotonic reasoning was discovered in connection 
with AI, many logicians pursue it as a purely mathematical study, independent of 
applications to AI or logic programming (another non-entry in Dreyfus’ index). 
2. The future of logic-based AI 
The review editors asked me to say what I think the obstacles are to human- 
level AI by the logic route and why I think they can be overcome. If anyone could 
make a complete list of the obstacles, this would be a major step towards 
overcoming them. What I can actually do is much more tentative. 
Workers in logic-based AI hope to reach human level in a logic-based system. 
Such a system would, as proposed in [7], represent what it knew about the world 
in general, about the particular situation and about its goals by sentences in logic. 
Other data structures, e.g. for representing pictures, would be present together 
with programs for creating them, manipulating them and for getting sentences for 
describing them. The program would perform actions that it inferred were 
appropriate for achieving its goals. 
Logic-based AI is the most ambitious approach to AI, because it proposes to 
understand the common sense world well enough to express what is required for 
successful action in formulas. Other approaches to AI do not require this. 
Anything based on neural nets, for example, hopes that a net can be made to 
learn human-level capability without the people who design the original net 
knowing much about the world in which their creation learns. Maybe this will 
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work, but then they may have an intelligent machine and still not understand how 
it works. This prospect seems to appeal to some people. 
Common sense knowledge and reasoning is at the core of AI, because a human 
or an intelligent machine always starts from a situation in which the information 
available to it has a common sense character. Mathematical models of the 
traditional kind are imbedded in common sense. This was not obvious, and many 
scientists s#upposed that the development of mathematical theories would obviate 
the need for common sense terminology in scientific work. Here are two 
quotations that express this attitude. 
One service mathematics has rendered to the human race. It has put common 
sense back where it belongs, on the topmost shelf next to the dusty canister 
labelled “discarded nonsense”. (E. T. Bell) 
All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the 
fundamental axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in advanced 
sciences such as gravitational astronomy, the word “cause” never occurs . . . . 
The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among 
philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only 
because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm. . . . (B. Russell, “On the 
Notion of Cause”, Proc. Aristotelian Sot. 13 (1913) l-26.) 
The “Nemesis” theory of the mass extinctions holds that our sun has a 
companion star that every 13 million years comes close enough to disrupt the 
Oort cloud of comets, some of which then come into the inner solar system and 
bombard the earth causing extinctions. The Nemesis theory involves gravitational 
astronomy, but it doesn’t propose a precise orbit for the star Nemesis and still less 
proposes orbits for the comets in the Oort cloud. Therefore, the theory is 
formulated in terms of the common sense notion of causality. 
It was natural for Russell and Bell to be pleased that mathematical laws were 
available for certain phenomena that had previously been treated only informally. 
However, they were interested in a hypothetical information situation in which 
the scientist has a full knowledge of an initial configuration, e.g. in celestial 
mechanics, and needs to predict the future. It is only when people began to work 
on AI that it became clear that general intelligence requires machines that can 
handle the common sense information situation in which concepts like “causes” 
are appropriate. Even after that it took 20 years before it was apparent that 
nonmonotonic reasoning could be and had to be formalized. 
Making a logic-based human-level program requires enough progress on at least 
the following problems: 
l Exten,sions of mathematical logic. Besides nonmonotonic reasoning other 
problems in the logic of AI are beginning to take a definite form including 
formalization of contexts as objects. This can provide a logical way of 
matching the human ability to use language in different ways depending on 
context [l, 4, 9, lo]. 
l Elaboration tolerance. Formalisms need to be elaboratable without a human 
having to start the formalism over from the beginning. There are ideas but 
no articles as yet. 
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l Concurrent events. Gelfond, Lifschitz and Rabinov [2] treat this using the 
situation calculus, and I have some recent and still unpublished results aimed 
at a simpler treatment. 
l Zntentionality. The treatment of mental objects such as beliefs (much 
discussed in the philosophical literature) and the corresponding term con- 
cept, e.g. “what he thinks electrons are” (hardly at all discussed in the 
formal literature). 
l Reification. We need a better understanding of what are to be considered 
objects in the logic. For example, a full treatment of the missionaries-and- 
cannibals problem together with reasonable elaborations must allow us to 
say, “There are just two things wrong with the boat.” 
l Zntrospection and transcendence. Human intelligence has the ability to 
survey, in some sense, the whole of its activity, and to consider any 
assumption, however built-in, as subject to question. Humans aren’t really 
very good at this, and it is only needed for some very high-level problems. 
Nevertheless, we want it, and there are some ideas about how to get it. What 
may work is to use the context mechanism as discussed in [lo] to go beyond 
the outermost context considered so far. Unfortunately, too many people 
concentrated on self-referential sentences. It’s a cute subject, but not 
relevant to human introspection or to the kinds of introspection we will have 
to make computers do. 
l Levels of description. If one is asked how an event occurred, one can often 
answer by giving a sequence of lower-level events that answer the question 
for the particular occurrence. Once I bought some stamps by going to the 
stamp selling machine in the airport and putting in six dollars, etc. Each of 
these subevents has a how, but I didn’t plan them, and cannot recall them. A 
stamp buying coach would have analyzed them to a lower level than I could 
and would be able to teach me how to buy stamps more effectively. For AI 
we therefore need a more flexible notion than the computer science theories 
of how programs are built up from elementary operations. 
Dreyfus asks why anyone should believe all this can be done. It seems as good a 
bet as any other difficult scientific problem. Recently progress has become more 
rapid, and many people have entered the field of logical AI in the last 1.5 years. 
Besides those whose papers I referenced, these include Raymond Reiter, Leora 
Morgenstern, Donald Perlis, Ernest Davis, Murray Shanahan, David Ethering- 
ton, Yoav Shoham, Fangzhen Lin, Sarit Kraus, Matthew Ginsberg, Douglas 
Lenat, R.V. Guha, Hector Levesque, Jack Minker, Tom Costello, Erik San- 
dewall, Kurt Konolige and many others. There aren’t just a few “die-hard?. 
However, reaching human-level AI is not a problem that is within engineering 
range of solution. Very likely, fundamental scientific discoveries are still to come. 
3. Common sense in Lenat’s work 
Douglas Lenat is one of the few workers in AI at whose recent work Dreyfus 
has taken a peek. 
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Dreyfus, on pages xvii and xviii, writes: 
When, instead of developing philosophical theories of the transcendental 
conditions that must hold if the mind is to represent the world, or proposing 
psychological models of how the storage and retrieval of propositional 
representations works, researchers in AI actually tried to formulate and 
organize everyday consensus knowledge, they ran into what has come to be 
called the commonsense-knowledge problem. There are really at least three 
problems grouped under this rubric: 
(1) How everyday knowledge must be organized so that one can make 
inferences from it. 
(2) How skills or know-how can be represented as knowing-that. 
(3) How relevant knowledge can be brought to bear in particular situations. 
While representationalists have written programs that attempt to deal with 
each of these problems, there is no generally accepted solution, nor is there a 
proof that these problems cannot be solved. What is clear is that all attempts 
to solve them have run into unexpected difficulties, and this in turn suggests 
that there may well be in-principle limitations on representationalism. At the 
very least these difficulties lead us to question why anyone would expect the 
representationalist project to succeed. 
That’s not too bad a summary except for the rhetorical question at the end. 
Why should one expect it to be easy, and why should one expect it not to succeed 
eventually in reaching human-level intelligence? Most of the people who have 
pursued th’e approach have seen enough of what they regard as progress to expect 
eventual success. I have referred to some of this progress in my account of the 
invention and development of formalized nonmonotonic reasoning. 
Mostly I agree with what Lenat said (as Dreyfus quotes him in the book), and I 
don’t find much support for Dreyfus’ assertions that empathy rather than just 
verbalizable understanding is required in order to understand human action. I 
think the example on page xix of what “it” means in 
Mary #saw a dog in the window. She wanted it. 
is within the capability of some current parsers that use semantic and pragmatic 
information. 
However, I think the following assertion of Lenat’s [5] quoted by Dreyfus on 
page xxv is an oversimplification. 
These layers of analogy and metaphor eventually “bottom out” at physical- 
somatic-primitives: up, down, forward, back, pain, ssssscold, inside, seeing, 
sleeping, tasting, growing, containing, moving, making noise, hearing, birth, 
death, strain, exhaustion, . . . . 
The contact of humans (and future robots) with the common sense world is on 
many levels, and our concepts are on many levels. Events that might bottom out 
physically--as informing someone of something may physically bottom out in 
making a noise-often don’t bottom out epistemologically. We may assert that A 
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informed B of something without our being able to describe the act in terms of 
making noise or typing on a keyboard. 
While I don’t agree with Lenat’s formulation, the success of Cyc doesn’t 
depend on its correctness. Cyc perfectly well can (and indeed does) store 
information obtained on several levels of organization and used by programs 
interacting with the world on several levels. 
All this doesn’t guarantee that Cyc will succeed as a database of common sense 
knowledge. There may be too big a conceptual gap in the AI community’s ideas 
of what are the usefully stored elements of common sense knowledge. 
4. The degenerating research program 
In the first edition of Dreyfus’ book there were some challenges to AI. Dreyfus 
said computers couldn’t exhibit “ambiguity tolerance”, “fringe consciousness” 
and “zeroing in”. These were left so imprecise that most readers couldn’t see any 
definite problem at all. In the succeeding 30 years Dreyfus has neither made these 
challenges more precise nor proposed any new challenges, however imprecise. It’s 
a pity, because AI could use a critic saying, “Here’s the easiest thing I don’t see 
how you can do”. That part of Dreyfus’ research program has certainly 
degenerated. 
However, I can give a definite meaning to the phrase “ambiguity tolerance” 
that may not be too far from Dreyfus’ vague idea, and with which formalized 
nonmonotonic reasoning can deal. The idea is that a concept is to be taken by 
default as unambiguous in a particular case unless there is reason to do otherwise. 
Here’s an example. Suppose that some knowledge engineer has the job of 
making an adviser for assistant district attorneys. The prosecutor answers some 
questions about the facts of the case, and the program suggests asking for 
indictments for certain crimes. We suppose that attempting to bribe a public 
official is one of these crimes. 
We ask whether the knowledge engineer must have anticipated the following 
three possible defenses against the charge, i.e. have decided whether the 
following circumstances till justify an indictment. 
(1) The defendant’s lawyer claims that his client did not know the person he 
offered money to fix his drunk driving convictions was the commissioner of 
motor vehicles. His client thought he was just an influential lawyer. 
(2) The defendant’s lawyer claims that while his client may have thought he 
was bribing the commissioner of motor vehicles, he really wasn’t, because 
the Governor had never properly signed the commission. 
(3) The defendant put an advertisement in the Criminal Gazette offering 
$5,000 to any public official who would fix his conviction. Must the 
prosecution exhibit a specific public official the defendant was attempting 
to bribe in order to get a conviction for “attempting to bribe a public 
official”. 
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There may be further potential ambiguities in the statute. If we demand that 
the knowledge engineer have resolved all of them before he can write his expert 
system, we are asking for the impossible. Legislators, lawyers and judges don’t 
see all th.e ambiguities in advance. 
Notice that in most cases of bribing a public official, there was a specific 
individual, and he really was a public official and this was really known to the 
defendant. Very likely, the legislators had not thought of any other possibilities. 
The nonrnonotonic reasoning approach to ambiguity tolerance says that by default 
the statute is unambiguous in a particular case. Indeed this is how the law works. 
The courts will not invalidate a law because of a general ambiguity; it has to be 
ambiguous in a significant way in the particular case. 
Since the expert system writer cannot anticipate all the possible ambiguities, he 
must make his system ambiguity-tolerant. 
When an ambiguity is actually pointed out to the expert system, it would be 
best if it advised looking at cases to see which way the statute had been 
interpreted by judges. I don’t know whether to be a useful adviser in statutory 
criminal law, the expert system would have to have a library of cases and the 
ability to reason from them. 
I have not written logical formulas for ambiguity tolerance, i.e. expressing the 
default that a concept, possibly ambiguous in general, is to be considered 
unambiguous in particular cases unless there is evidence to the contrary. 
However, I would be strongly motivated to give it high priority if Dreyfus were to 
offer to bet money that I can’t. 
To conclude: Dreyfus has posed various challenges to AI from time to time, but 
he doesn’t seem to make any of them precise. Here is my challenge to Dreyfus, 
whereby he might rescue his research program from degeneration. 
What is the least complex intellectual behavior that you think humans can do 
and computers can’t? It would be nice to have more details than were given in 
connection with “ambiguity tolerance” and “zeroing in”. 
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